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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-4344
___________
VICTOR WHEELER; SANDRA J. WHEELER; JAMES K. SISSON; NANCY A.
SISSON; BRUCE D. REDFIELD, III; TAMERA J. REDFIELD; VINCENT J.
BARTOSEK; PATTY BARTOSEK; DAVID WARNER; TINA M. WARNER
v.
MATERIAL RECOVERY OF ERIE INC.; RICHARD A. SOMMERS; NORTHWEST
PENNSYLVANIA TRAILS ASSOCIATION; KATHY SCHRECKENGOST;
PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY; FIRSTENERGY CORP.; CANADIAN
NATIONAL RAILWAY COMPANY; SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD
Victor Wheeler; Sandra J. Wheeler;
James K. Sisson; Nancy A. Sisson, Appellants
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 06-cv-00085)
District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 27, 2010
Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 1, 2010 )
_________
OPINION
_________
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PER CURIAM
Appellants, landowners from Erie County, Pennsylvania, appeal from an order of
the District Court denying Appellants’ petition for review of a decision of the Surface
Transportation Board (“STB” or the “Board”),1 in which the Board, upon referral, denied
Appellants’ request that the STB reopen its earlier determination that a 5.73-mile rail
right-of-way had been properly “railbanked” for interim trail use in 1990 under the
National Trails System Act (the “Trails Act”).2 The STB’s decision also denied
Appellants’ request for oral argument and discovery, and granted the joint motion of
Appellees Material Recovery and Northwest Pennsylvania Trails Association to reopen
the matter for the limited purposes of allowing the substitution of one trail sponsor for
another. For the following reasons, we will affirm.
I.
Appellants are the owners of parcels of land adjacent to a 5.73-mile strip of land
(the “Trail”) that, prior to 1973, served a railway line owned and operated by Penn

1

The STB is the agency charged under the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §
10101, et seq., with regulating rail carriers that provide transportation over any part of the
interstate rail network. See 49 U.S.C. § 10501.
2

The Trails Act was enacted in 1968 to establish a nationwide system of nature trails.
In 1983, Congress added a rail section, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d), to serve the dual
purpose of preserving unused railroad rights-of-way for possible future rail use and
promoting nature trails. See Preseault v. I.C.C, 494 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1990). “Railbanking” is
the “preserv[ation] of unused railway rights-of-way for future use” under the terms of the
statute. Ellamae Phillips Co. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
2

Central Railroad.3 Appellants also hold a reversionary interest in the Trail. In 1973, the
Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”), the STB’s predecessor agency, issued a
decision authorizing Penn Central to abandon operations on the railroad line. The ICC’s
order to cease operations was subsequently stayed by Penn Central’s bankruptcy. In
1974, Congress passed the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93236, 87 Stat. 985 (1974) (the “3R Act”), whose purpose was to reorganize the bankrupt
Penn Central (and other failing carriers) and establish procedures for disposing of rail
lines operated by those carriers. Pursuant to these procedures, the right-of-way over the
portion of the rail that included the Trail was transferred to the Bessemer & Lake Erie
Railroad Company (“B&LE”), a subsidiary of Canadian National Railway. From 1976 to
1989, the Trail remained unused.
In August, 1989, B&LE entered into a contingent agreement with Material
Recovery of Erie, Inc. (“MR”) to convey its interest in the Trail to MR as part of the
process of railbanking the Trail under the Railbanking Act.4 Upon application to the
STB, the Board granted MR a Notice of Interim Trail Use (“NITU”) pursuant to 49
C.F.R. § 1152.29(a). See Docket No. AB-88 (Sub-No. 5X), Jan. 8, 1990 Decision (the

3

Penn Central did not hold title to the land in fee simple, leasing it instead from the
Erie & Pittsburgh Railroad Company.
4

The Railbanking Act is triggered when a railroad desires to terminate its common
carrier obligation to provide freight rail service on a line, an action requiring approval
from the STB. 49 U.S.C. § 10903. When a qualified entity desires to negotiate with a
railroad concerning the preservation of a corridor for future rail and interim trail use, it
must request that the STB issue a railbanking order known as a certificate, or notice, of
interim trail use. See 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a).
3

“1990 NITU”). No party sought judicial review of the 1990 NITU.
In 1997, MR filed for bankruptcy. As part of the bankruptcy proceeding, MR
sought to convey its interest in the Trail to Pennsylvania Electric Company (“Penelec”).
The Appellants, as adjacent property owners, intervened in the bankruptcy proceeding
and objected to the proposed sale, arguing that their reversionary interests in the Trail’s
right-of-way had vested. The bankruptcy court referred the issue to the STB. Pursuant to
that referral, MR filed a petition to reopen and clarify the 1990 NITU. The STB reopened
the 1990 NITU and issued a decision concluding that the right-of-way had been properly
transferred and that the Trail had been properly railbanked. See Docket No. AB-88 (SubNo. 5X), May 21, 1997 Decision (the “1997 STB Order”). The STB issued its decision as
“advisory,” however, because the bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction over the Trail and
any final determination of legal ownership. The STB further indicated that, should the
bankruptcy court approve a sale of the right-of-way to Penelec, Penelec would be
required to comply with the procedures at 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(f) to ensure that the rightof-way would continue to be railbanked pursuant to the Trails Act.
The bankruptcy court ultimately permitted MR to grant a utility easement over the
Trail right-of-way to Penelec (as opposed to an outright sale), but made no determination
of the adjoining property owners’ rights. See In re Material Recovery of Erie, Inc.,
Bankruptcy No. 94-10812, November 30, 1999 Decision. Appellants did not appeal.
In 2005, MR entered into an agreement with the Northwest Pennsylvania Trail
Association (“NWPTA”) for NWPTA to purchase property from MR unrelated to the
4

Trail. In addition, the parties entered into a separate “Donation Agreement” that
contemplated the future donation of the Trail to NWPTA. See Donation Agreement,
Appellee’s Supplemental App. 216-219. In April, 2006, Appellants filed an action in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania to enforce the 1997
STB Order under 28 U.S.C. § 1336(a).5 The complaint alleged that MR and the NWPTA
had violated the 1997 STB Order by failing to comply with the provisions of 49 C.F.R. §
1152.29(f), resulting in an abandonment of the property and the triggering of Appellants’
reversionary interests in the right-of-way. Pursuant to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, the District Court referred the matter to the STB in March 2007. See 28
U.S.C. § 1336(b); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Ametek, Inc., 104 F.3d 558, 561 (3d Cir. 1997)
(explaining that a district court may refer issues to the STB for determination when the
question falls within the STB’s primary jurisdiction). Appellants then filed a petition
before the STB seeking a declaratory judgment concerning their legal rights to the Trail.
See Petition of Victor Wheeler, et al., for Declaratory Order (STB Finance Docket No.
35082), filed September 14, 2007 (the “Petition for Declaratory Order”).
MR and NWPTA subsequently filed a separate action asking the STB to reopen
the 1990 NITU docket, vacate the existing NITU, and substitute NWPTA as the trail
sponsor pursuant to the transfer provisions of 49 C.F.R § 1152.29(f). See Joint Motion of
NWPTA and MR for Substitution of New Interim Trail User (Docket No. AB-88 (Sub5

28 U.S.C. § 1336 provides that the district courts shall have jurisdiction in any civil
action to “enforce, in whole or in part, any order of the Surface Transportation Board.”
28 U.S.C. § 1336(a).
5

No. 5X)), October 9, 2007 (the “Motion for Substitution”). Appellants opposed the
motion and requested discovery, oral argument, and concurrent and expedited
consideration of both matters.
The STB granted Appellants’ motion to have the two cases considered
concurrently and in August 2008, issued a single decision with respect to the issues raised
by both the Petition for Declaratory Order and Motion for Substitution. See STB Finance
Docket No. 35082, August 27, 2008 Decision (“2008 STB Order”). The STB rejected
Appellants’ request for discovery, noting that discovery is not typically conducted in
declaratory order proceedings, that Appellants had ample opportunity to pursue discovery
in the District Court, and that Appellants had not indicated what additional materials they
wished to obtain. Regarding Appellants’ request for oral argument, the STB noted that
under 49 C.F.R. § 1114.6, it could take judicial notice of the records in prior Board
proceedings pertaining to the Trail, and therefore had “sufficient information with which
to resolve the issues” referred to it by the District Court. The Board also noted that
Appellants “had not demonstrated that there are any material matters in dispute that
cannot be adequately considered and resolved based on written submissions.” 2008 STB
Order at 6.
Turning to the merits, the STB determined that Appellants’ claim that the Trail had
been abandoned prior to being railbanked in 1990 was essentially a challenge to the
Board’s 1997 decision with respect to the railbanked status of the right-of-way.
Therefore, the STB treated Appellants’ motion as a petition to reopen the 1997 STB
6

Order and applied the standard governing motions to reopen, which requires a showing of
new evidence, changed circumstances, or material error. See 49 U.S.C. § 772(c); 49
C.F.R. § 1115.4. The STB found that Appellants offered no new evidence or changed
circumstances in support of their claim, but considered whether they had demonstrated
material error. The STB considered Appellant’s arguments and concluded that there was
no material error to justify reopening the 1997 STB Order.
The STB treated the remainder of Appellants’ pleading as a petition for a
declaratory order declaring that MR had violated the 1997 STB Order by failing to create
a trail after it had been authorized to acquire the right-of-way for interim trail use. The
STB declined to find a violation on these grounds because the Trails Act specifies no time
limit in which a trail must be developed or its intended level of use. The STB also
rejected Appellants’ argument that MR had violated the order by failing to meet its
financial and legal obligations with respect to the Trail. Accordingly, the STB denied
Appellants’ petition for a declaratory order.
In the same opinion, the STB approved the separately filed joint motion of MR and
NWPTA to substitute the latter as the new trail sponsor. In order to effect the
substitution, the STB was required by statute to reopen the proceedings in Docket No.
AB-88 (Sub-No. 5X) for the limited purpose of replacing the NITU served on January 8,
1990, with a replacement NITU substituting NWPTA as interim trail sponsor. See 49
C.F.R. § 1152.29(f)(2).
Following the Board’s decision, Appellants filed a timely petition for review in the
7

District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1336(b), which provides that a district court has
jurisdiction to review an action to “enforce, enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend” any order
of the Board “arising out of” the court’s referral. The District Court denied the petition
on September 10, 2009. The District Court’s order also granted the motions to dismiss
filed by Appellees NWPTA, Kathy Schreckengost, Penelec, MR and Richard Sommers.
Appellant Wheeler, proceeding pro se, timely filed a notice of appeal.6
II
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. When reviewing a district court’s
affirmance of an agency decision, we review the district court’s decision de novo, while
applying the “appropriate standard of review to the agency’s decision.” See Concerned
Citizens Alliance, Inc., v. Slater, 176 F.3d 686, 693 (3d Cir. 1999) (quotations and
citations omitted); see also Fertilizer Inst. v. Browner, 163 F.3d 774, 777 (3d Cir. 1998).
Under this deferential standard we may set aside an agency decision only if it is “found to
be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”
Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). “The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and
capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); see also Fertilizer, 163 F.3d at 777. We must only determine
6

The notice of appeal filed by Sandra Wheeler, James Sisson, and Nancy Sisson, was
not timely filed within the 60-day time limit set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. § 4(a)(1)(B) and
28 U.S.C. § 2107(b). We therefore lack jurisdiction over those appeals, with the
exception of the appeal of Victor Wheeler’s spouse, Sandra Wheeler, over which we have
jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(2).
8

“whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether
there has been a clear error of judgment.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43
(quotations and citations omitted). An agency decision is not arbitrary or capricious
where it has articulated a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.” Id. at 52. Furthermore, courts must be deferential to an agency’s interpretation of
a statute in situations in which “Congress has been either ‘silent or ambiguous’” on the
question under consideration. Southwestern Pa. Growth Alliance v. Browner, 121 F.3d
106, 116 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
III.
Appellants argue that the District Court erred in holding that the STB’s decision
not to reopen its earlier determinations that the Trail had been properly railbanked was
non-reviewable under the Supreme Court’s holding in I.C.C. v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. 270, 284 (1987) (“BLE”). BLE held that a court may
not review the ICC’s refusal to reopen proceedings unless the motion to reopen was based
on new evidence of changed circumstances.7 Id. Because Appellants’ motion to reopen
was based on the ground of material error, the District Court found that it was not
reviewable. Id. at 279. Appellants argued that, under this Court’s holding in Friends of
the Atglen-Susquehanna Trail, Inc., v. S.T.B., when the STB reopened the 1990 NITU for
the limited purpose of substituting NWPTA as trail sponsor, it made the reopening order
7

The STB is the successor agency to the ICC.
9

reviewable “for all purposes.” 252 F.3d 246, 260 (3d Cir. 2001) (concluding that when
the STB explicitly reopens a case, even for a limited purpose, it makes every aspect of the
reopening order subject to review); see also BLE, 482 U.S. at 278 (holding that when the
agency “reopens a proceeding for any reason and, after reconsideration, issues a new and
final order setting forth the rights and obligations of the parties, that order – even if it
merely reaffirms the rights and obligations set forth in the original order – is reviewable
on its merits”). The District Court rejected this argument, distinguishing Atglen on the
basis that the reopening at issue in this case was a “purely ministerial act that did not
touch on the merits whatsoever.” District Court Op. 19. Without reaching the question
whether a “purely ministerial” reopening can be distinguished under Atglen, we will
affirm its conclusion that the STB’s decision in this case was unreviewable on alternative
grounds.8
Appellants’ argument fails because they are conflating separate actions taken by
the STB in two separate cases. At Appellants’ request, the 2008 STB Order dealt
concurrently with the issues presented by the parties in two separate actions: (1) MR and
NWPTA’s joint Motion for Substitution (filed under STB Docket No. AB-88 (Sub-No
5X)), and (2) Appellants’ Petition for Declaratory Order (filed under STB Finance Docket
No. 35802). As discussed, supra, the STB denied the relief sought by Appellants in their
Petition for Declaratory Order, including their implicit challenge to the 1997 STB Order,
8

We may affirm the District Court on any ground supported by the record. See
Travelers Indemnity Co., v. Dammann & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 238, 256 n.12 (3d Cir.
2010).
10

which the STB treated as a motion to reopen on the grounds of material error. In the
same opinion the STB also granted MR and NWPTA’s motion for substitution of interim
trail user, which had originally been filed as a separate action. The Appellants opposed
the Motion for Substitution in a separately filed reply, see Appellee’s Supplemental
Appendix 230-242, and the two cases were never consolidated. Although both actions
arise out of the same facts and circumstances, they were filed as separate actions and raise
distinct claims. The STB’s limited reopening of the 1990 NITU in the substitution action
does not make the STB’s decision not to reopen proceedings in the separately filed
declaratory action open to review. Appellant presented no new evidence or allegations of
changed circumstances in support of its argument before the STB. Accordingly, we will
affirm the District Court’s conclusion that the STB’s denial of Appellant’s motion to
reopen based on material error is unreviewable. See BLE, 482 U.S. at 280.
We will also affirm the District Court’s conclusion that the STB did not act
arbitrarily or capriciously in determining that NWPTA and MR had not violated 49
C.F.R. § 1152.29(f) by entering into the Donation Agreement. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs.,
463 U.S. at 42; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (explaining that courts should apply an “arbitrary
and capricious standard” of review to agency decisions). Section 1152.9(f) sets forth the
regulatory provisions relating to the substitution of a trail sponsor. 49 C.F.R. §
1152.29(f).9 To effect a substitution, the current and future trail sponsor must jointly file
9

The Board’s role under the Trails Act is limited with respect to administering notices
of interim trail use. When a request for an NITU is filed, the Board’s only responsibility
is to confirm that the trail sponsor agrees to assume full liability for the property during
11

a copy of the existing NITU and the new trail user must file a statement of willingness to
assume financial responsibility. Once approved, the Board is required to reopen the
abandonment proceeding, vacate the existing NITU, and issue an appropriate replacement
NITU. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(f)(2).
The Donation Agreement provided that MR’s “obligation to transfer the property
[was] contingent on . . . completion of all necessary railbanking documents and filings
with the [STB] to preserve the property’s interim trail status.” Donation Agreement at ¶
5. The Donation Agreement further provided that until such time as the proper STB
authorization could be obtained, NWPTA would lease and maintain the right-of-way, pay
the real estate taxes, and indemnify MR for any liability associated with the Trail’s use.
The STB reviewed the Donation Agreement and concluded that 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(f)
had not been violated because the agreement explicitly conditioned the proposed transfer
on obtaining Board approval, leaving MR ultimately responsible for the Trail until the
requisite approval was procured. We agree that the STB’s decision was well-reasoned
and neither arbitrary nor capricious.
The District Court also affirmed the Board’s conclusion that MR’s single tax
delinquency did not constitute an abandonment of the Trail because Appellants failed to
make a specific showing that the trail sponsor had not met its financial obligations
the interim trail use and to keep the property available for reactivation of rail service. 16
U.S.C. § 1247(d); 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a)(3). The Board is then required by statute to
“reopen the abandonment or exemption proceeding, vacate the existing NITU or CITU;
and issue an appropriate replacement NITU or CITU to the new trail user.” 49 C.F.R. §
1152.29(f)(2).
12

pertaining to the Trail. The Appellants’ evidence that MR failed to meet its financial
responsibilities consisted of one letter from the Girard County Tax Collector, dated
November 10, 1999, stating that MR had not paid taxes for property in that county in
1998. The STB concluded that without evidence that STB was in arrears regarding any
financial obligation relating to the right-of-way, the letter was insufficient to support a
finding that MR had failed to meet its financial and legal obligations pertaining to the
trail. We agree with the District Court that it was not arbitrary or capricious for the STB
to hold that allegedly missing one property tax payment over 10 years ago was
insufficient to demonstrate a failure to meet financial obligations. See Jost v. S.T.B., 194
F.3d 79, 89-90 (D.C. Cir. 1999).10
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court.

10

We have considered the Appellant’s remaining argument but find them
unpersuasive.

